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This paper examines how shared capitalism compensation systems - those that link employee pay
to company performance - affect diverse employee outcomes.  It uses two data sets: the national GSS
survey that provides a broad representative view of the extent of the programs; and the NBER Shared
Capitalism Project surveys of workers in 14 companies that use shared capitalism programs extensively.
We find that greater involvement in the programs is generally linked to greater participation in decisions,
higher quality supervision and treatment of employees, more training, higher pay and benefits, greater
job security, and higher job satisfaction.  We also find positive interactions of shared capitalism with
high-performance policies in predicting participation in decisions and overall job satisfaction, and
negative interactions of shared capitalism with close supervision in affecting almost all of the outcomes.
Overall the results support the idea that workers can gain by sharing, but whether this happens is contingent
on other workplace policies.
Douglas Kruse
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  Today, more employees than ever before have ownership stakes in their firms through 
ESOPs and firm-based stock ownership plans, receive stock options once limited to top 
executives, and are covered by profit-sharing plans.  The media has publicized both the rewards 
and dangers of tying worker pay and wealth to company performance.  The 1990's produced many 
stories of regular employees becoming millionaires by working in Silicon Valley firms with 
broad-based options that paid off handsomely.  The early 2000’s produced stories about Enron 
employees losing their retirement moneys in a 401(k) plan that was heavily concentrated in 
company stock.  Apart from the extreme cases that get publicized, are these programs generally 
good or bad for workers?   
  This paper analyzes the relationship of shared capitalism programs to a range of employee 
outcomes:  participation in decisions, supervision, training, company treatment of employees, pay, 
job security, and job satisfaction.   It uses data from the 2002 and 2006 General Social Surveys 
(GSS), which covered 2226 persons in for-profit firms from a nationally representative sample, 
and data from an NBER-sponsored firm based survey of over 40,000 employees at 320 worksites 
in 14 companies for whom these programs are a key part of their compensation systems.  
WHAT WE EXPECT 
  On the basis of incentive and organization theory and previous empirical work, we expect 
that linking employee pay to company performance will impact workers in several ways.   
Employee Participation in Decision-Making  
  Shared capitalist compensation systems should be associated with greater freedom for 
workers to make decisions at their workplace.  It is difficult to imagine a firm devolving decisions 
to workers without developing some pecuniary mechanism for motivating them to make decisions 
in the firm's interest, be it profit-sharing, gain-sharing, stock options or share ownership.  Indeed,  
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one common reason for firms to institute compensation systems relating employee pay to company 
performance is to induce workers to make decisions that improve firm performance.
1   
  Two national surveys of workers have found the expected relation.  For the U.S., Dube and 
Freeman  (2001) found a positive relation between shared capitalist compensation systems and 
employee decision-making in Freeman and Rogers’ (1999) Workers Representation and 
Participation Survey, with strong results for profit-sharing but weak results for employee 
ownership.  For the UK, Conyon and Freeman (2004) found a positive link between changes in 
variable pay and changes in decision-making in the Workplace Employment Relations Survey.  
However, firm-based studies of employee ownership find only a weak pattern between perceived 
or desired participation in decision-making and employee ownership. Half of the ten studies 
reviewed by Kruse and Blasi (1997) found participation levels higher with employee ownership 
while half found no difference in participation.  None of the studies found a connection between 
participation in decisions and the size of one's ownership stake.  Two of the studies that asked 
about desired participation found no difference between employee-owners and non-owners, while 
a third study found a decline in desired worker participation after an employee buyout, which the 
author attributes to wariness by employees about the commitment levels of new employees and 
trust in management (Long, 1981, 1982).   
Supervision, Training, and Treatment of Workers 
  Any shared compensation system must overcome potential free rider problems.  The larger 
the number of people who share in the rewards of the firm or group, the lower is the incentive for 
                                                 
1 Over 60 studies indicate that profit sharing, employee ownership, and stock options are associated with better firm 
performance on average.  However, there is a great dispersion around that average as some companies greatly 
outperform, and others under perform their non-sharing counterparts, for reasons that research has not yet pinned 
down. (Kruse and Blasi, 1997; Kruse, 2003; Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein, 2003).  
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the individual to work hard and the greater the reward to shirking.  In our companion paper, we 
find that worker monitoring of the group is an important mode for overcoming the free rider 
problem (Freeman, Kruse, and Blasi 2008).  Firms cannot force workers to self-monitor but they 
can provide supportive supervision, training, and a workplace climate that encourages group 
norms to sustain a self-monitoring equilibrium.   
  Few studies have examined the relation of shared capitalism programs to supervision, 
training, and workplace climate. Brown and Sessions (2003) report that employees in 
performance-related pay plans have more positive views about management-employee relations 
and how the workplace is run.  Two studies have found that employee in profit-sharing plans are 
more likely to receive employer-provided training (Azfar and Danninger, 2001; Robinson and 
Zhang, 2005). Two studies have examined whether workplaces are safer under shared employee 
ownership. Rooney (1992) found fewer OSHA injuries in employee ownership companies with 
greater worker participation in decisions, but otherwise found mixed results for ownership without 
participation.  Rhodes and Steers (1981) found that accidents were no lower in a plywood 
cooperative compared to a standard plywood company.     
Pay and Benefits 
There are two reasons for expecting shared capitalist compensation systems to be  
associated with higher pay and benefits.   
  First, shared capitalist systems could operate in part as a "gift exchange" between the 
worker and the firm, in which the higher pay increases worker effort, decreases turnover, and 
increases worker loyalty (Akerlof, 1982).  By encouraging employee cooperation, shared 
capitalism programs could increase output, some of which would go to workers as their share of 
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profits and some as higher base wages or benefits.  The sharing system would be a key component 
of a mutual-gains or high-commitment system where both workers and the firms come out ahead 
(Handel and Levine, 2004: 5).  Second, since shared capitalism increases risk to workers, 
compensating differential theory predicts that workers will want higher overall compensation.  
Whether this compensation takes the form of fixed pay and benefits or shows up in a larger share in 
profits and ownership is unclear.  Again, what creates the potential for higher income to workers is 
the higher productivity generated by the system. 
  Despite some well-publicized examples of wage concessions when workers buy out their 
companies or accept large ownership stakes (which make up a very small percentage of the 
employee ownership landscape), workers in employee ownership plans tend to have comparable 
or higher wages or compensation than other workers.  Blasi et al. (1996) found that public 
companies with broad-based employee ownership plans had 8% higher average compensation 
levels than other comparable public companies, and compensation increased with the percentage 
of stock held by employees.  Studies of pay and benefits in ESOP and non-ESOP firms in 
Massachusetts and Washington state also found that the levels of pay and other benefits were 
similar between these two types of firms, so that ESOPs appear to come on top of other worker pay 
and benefits (Kardas et al., 1998; Scharf and Mackin, 2000). With regard to other forms of 
ownership, Renaud et al. (2004) found that stock purchase plan participation was associated with 
subsequent pay increases for employees, and employer stock held in 401(k) plans appears to come 
largely on top of other pension assets (Kroumova, 2002).  Seven studies from the U.S., Great 
Britain, and Germany find that profit-sharing firms also have generally higher average 
compensation than otherwise-comparable firms (Kruse, 1993: 113-114; Handel and Gittleman, 
2004).  
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  Still, it is possible that the higher pay levels associated with shared capitalist compensation 
reflect higher unmeasured worker quality, and that workers in fact take a cut in compensation to 
link their pay to company performance.  But the evidence runs against these possibilities.  Kruse 
(1998) found that average base pay levels and other benefits increase as young workers join 
profit-sharing firms and decrease as they leave such firms, so worker selectivity cannot dominate 
the cross-sectional relation.  Similarly, Azfar and Danninger (2001) found that employees in 
profit-sharing plans receive higher annual raises in base pay than employees in other firms, 
connected in part to the greater training noted earlier.  Other studies find that neither wages nor 
total labor costs exclusive of the sharing component fall significantly in pre/post comparisons of 
firms that adopt profit sharing (Black et al., 2004, for wages; Cappelli and Neumark, 2004, for 
total labor costs).  The implication is that trade-offs between base pay and shared capitalist 
compensation are minimal and that profit sharing may be used in conjunction with higher base pay 
levels as part of an efficiency wage strategy.   
  Another possibility is that the higher monetary compensation associated with shared 
capitalist systems may come at the cost of greater effort, stress, workplace danger, or other 
disamenities at work.  Some analysts view the systems as a bit of a sham, designed to elicit greater 
worker effort and to shift risk to workers, without increasing the pay or quality of jobs.  This is 
"'management by stress' … which believes that [employee involvement] is simply a method of 
sweating the workforce and curbing worker power and influence" (Handel and Levine, 2004: 6).  
  Our data allows us to compare compensation for workers covered and not covered by the 
shared capitalist compensation and to compare compensation for workers by the intensity of their 




  Traditional analysis of labor-run firms predicts that they have lower employment than in 
management-run firms, and respond perversely to demand shocks, lowering employment when 
output prices increase  (reviewed in Bonin and Putterman, 1987).  Most analyses show that 
employee ownership firms tend to have more stable employment than other firms, but do not 
respond perversely to demand shocks (Craig and Pencavel, 1992, 1993; Blair et al., 2000).  Two 
studies report that employment grew faster in firms following the adoption of ESOPs, particularly 
if they have greater employee participation in decision-making (Quarrey and Rosen, 1993; 
Winther and Marens, 1997). In addition, public firms with substantial employee ownership are 
more likely than other comparable firms to survive over time (Blair et al., 2000; Park et al., 2004).  
French worker cooperatives also have high rates of survival (Estrin and Jones, 1992).  
  Profit sharing, in contrast, should create excess demand for employment and thus provide 
substantial job security (Weitzman, 1984).  Nineteen studies have examined Weitzman's 
predictions that profit sharing should stabilize firm employment (Kruse, 1998: 109-113).  A 
majority found that firms view profit sharing differently from fixed wages in making employment 
decisions.  Of the twelve studies directly examining employment stability, six found greater 
employment stability under profit sharing; four showed greater stability in some but not all 
samples; while two have little or no support for the stabilizing effects of profit sharing.    
Job satisfaction 
  If shared capitalism is associated with greater participation and decision-making at the 
workplace, better supervision, more training, more job security and higher total compensation, 
these modes of pay ought to raise job satisfaction.  But the 12 existing studies on job satisfaction  
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under employee ownership yield no clear generalization.
2  Several studies show higher 
satisfaction; several show no relationship; and one study shows lower satisfaction among 
employee-owners where the union had lost a bitter strike the year before.
3  Participation in 
decisions seems to be important: one longitudinal study found that satisfaction went up only 
among those who perceived increased participation in decisions after an employee buyout (Long, 
1982).  Our data provide the largest sample for assessing these inconclusive findings.  
  In sum, prior research on employee outcomes under shared capitalism has yielded 
generally positive results, though there is sufficient variability in some results to suggest that they 
depend on the context in which they are implemented.   By addressing all of the employee 
outcomes with the GSS and the NBER data sets, and providing more robust measures of the 
employment context inside these firms, we should be better able to provide a more consistent 
generalization than the existing work.  
DATA AND ANALYSIS  
The NBER Shared Capitalism Research Project uses two data sets to analyze how shared 
capitalist arrangements affect workers.  The first is the 2002 and 2006 General Social Surveys 
(GSS), on which we placed several questions on shared capitalism programs.  The 2002 GSS has a 
representative sample of 1,145 employees, and the 2006 GSS has a sample of 1,081 employees, in 
for-profit companies.   The second is a data set of employee surveys in 14 companies with one or 
more shared capitalism programs, which we conducted over the 2001-2006 period.  We selected 
these companies to vary in company size, industry, and type of shared capitalism program. Even 
                                                 
2  This is based on nine studies on job satisfaction reviewed in Kruse and Blasi (1997), plus Pendleton et al. (1998), 
Keef (1998), and Bakan et al. (2004).  The studies were selected if they used systematic data collection from 
representative samples of employees, and used statistical techniques to rule out sampling error.  Many used 
multivariate analysis to hold constant the effect of other factors on employee attitudes or behavior.    
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so, our sample is non-representative, first because many firms refused our requests to run the 
survey; and second because two of the firms were bought out by others who refused to proceed 
with the planned survey.  Each company in the sample agreed to have our research group 
administer a survey to all or a random sample of employees. The survey included core questions 
common across all companies, and some questions of special interest or relevance to that 
company.  Six company surveys were conducted entirely by web, seven company surveys were 
done on paper, and one survey was done using both the web and paper surveys.  The company 
response rates ranged from 11% to 80%, with an average of 53% across the 14 companies.  A total 
of 41,206 respondents provided usable surveys.  Appendix A describes the variables used in this 
analysis.  Companion papers that analyze the GSS and NBER datasets include Blasi, Kruse, and 
Markowitz (2008), Blasi et al. (2008), Buchele et al. (2008), Budd (2008), Carberry (2008), 
Freeman, Kruse, and Blasi (2008), Harden, Kruse, and Blasi (2008), and Kruse, Freeman, and 
Blasi (2008).   
  The overall prevalence of shared capitalist compensation is presented in Appendix Table 
A-1, with fuller presentation in our companion paper (Kruse, Blasi, and Park 2008).  For our 
purposes here the most important result is that 45% of the for-profit private sector employees in the 
GSS sample report participating in some kind of shared capitalism program (36% in profit sharing, 
25% in gainsharing, 19% in employee ownership, and 11% in stock options), which gives us good 
variation for examining the relation of these programs to worker outcomes.  The prevalence is of 
course higher in the NBER sample, since these firms were selected on the basis of having these 
programs. 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 Reminders by management that the strike would hurt ESOP account values brought the response "We don't vote; we 
don't control the company; we don't care" (Kruse, 1984).  
  9
  As a first step in assessing the relation of shared capitalism to employee outcomes, we 
constructed a thermometer-style index of shared capitalism, which assigns points based on 
coverage by shared capitalism programs and the size of the financial stakes.  This index is 
described in Appendix B.  We also present results breaking out the different forms of shared 
capitalism types and intensities using the NBER data.   
  Turning to employee outcomes, we have organized responses to questions in eight areas:  
participation in decisions, company treatment of employees, supervision, training, pay and 
benefits, co-worker relations, job security, and job satisfaction.  These outcomes are related to 
each other—e.g., training generally leads to higher pay; participation in decisions, training, job 
security, and supervision are likely to affect perceptions of how the company treats employees; 
and so on.  We lack instruments to identify causality, so we do not try to tease out possible causal 
links among the outcomes.  Rather, we first test for the reduced form relationship between shared 
capitalism and each of the individual outcomes conditional on demographic and job 
characteristics, and in some cases on other outcomes as well—e.g., since company training is 
likely to affect pay, we examine whether shared capitalism is related to pay both before and after 
controlling for training.   
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
  We first use the shared capitalist index to predict each of the outcomes (Table 1), and then 
probe the impact of different types and intensities of shared capitalist compensation (Tables B-1 to 
B-5).  We estimate OLS regressions when outcomes are numeric and use ordered probits when the 
outcomes have three or four values with a natural ordering (e.g., "not at all true, not very true, 
somewhat true, and very true").  The regression predicting hours of training use a Tobit 
specification, to account for the censoring at zero.  Most of the regressions using the NBER dataset  
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include company fixed effects so that coefficients reflect within-company differences rather than 
cross-company differences that might be due to unmeasured differences among the companies.   
At the bottom of Tables B-1 to B-5, some ESOP coefficients are reported where company fixed 
effects are not used.  Federal ERISA law imposes strict requirements on coverage so that most or 
all employees are covered by an ESOP within a firm; the small number of excluded employees are 
thus likely to differ in some particular way from other employees in the same firm.  Because of this 
the ESOP effects are better determined by comparing otherwise-similar ESOP and non-ESOP 
workers across firms in the specifications without fixed effects.  
Table 1 summarizes our empirical results in terms of the coefficients on the shared 
capitalism summated rating index variable for the seven outcomes under study.  In most cases, we 
examine more than one outcome under the specified domain. 
1.  Employee participation in decisions 
  Almost all of the measures of participation in decision-making in Table 1 are positively 
and significantly related to the shared capitalism index.  There are two exceptions in the NBER 
data -- the relationships with participation in company decisions and satisfaction with participation 
in the NBER data, but only after controlling for other outcomes (employee involvement team, 
training, and job security).  This indicates that shared capitalism is strongly correlated with these 
policies, and the package of these policies may be the most important determinant (which we 
examine in Table 2).   
  When the shared capitalism policies are broken out in Appendix Table B-1, the most 
consistent result is that profit sharing intensity (measured using the most recent bonus as a percent 
of pay) is linked to greater participation in decisions and greater satisfaction with participation 
(cols. 1-5).  The small negative coefficients on profit sharing eligibility (cols. 2, 3, and 5) indicate  
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that very low profit sharing bonuses are associated with lower participation and satisfaction—an 
effect that is erased as the bonus size increases.  In addition, while employee ownership is linked to 
greater participation in decisions (cols. 1-4) but satisfaction with participation is linked to 
employee-owned stock as a percent of pay (col. 5).   
  Examining the different types of employee ownership, the data show some significant 
associations but no strong patterns.  401(k) stock intensity is associated with greater involvement 
in job and department decisions (cols. 1-2), while involvement in company decisions is highest 
among those with any 401(k) employer stock or those who retain stock from exercised options 
(col. 3).  These latter two groups are also more likely to be in EI teams (col. 4), while satisfaction 
with participation is highest among those holding open market stock or with large ESOP or 401(k) 
stakes (col. 5).  As noted earlier, given the ERISA rules about coverage within a company, it is 
more sensible to make inferences about the effects of ESOPs by comparing workers between 
companies with and without ESOPs, which requires elimination of company fixed effects in the 
calculations.  When this is done at the bottom of Table B-1, the estimates show that ESOP 
participants are more likely to be involved in job, department, and company decisions (cols. 1-3), 
but are much less likely to be satisfied with their participation (col. 5).  This latter result, which is 
consistent with the within-company comparison, suggests that the simple membership in ESOPs in 
these companies may have raised the desire for participation more than they raised actual 
participation (or alternatively, that the additional participation itself raised desires for more 
participation in ESOP companies). The impact of an ESOP on worker outcomes may be more 
closely tied to the ESOP value as a percent of pay  -- i.e. ownership intensity in relationship to 
one’s economic situation – rather than simply membership in an EOSP plan. 
2. Company treatment of employees  
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   Both the GSS and the NBER company survey asked a variety of quality of work life 
questions.  Item 2 in Table 1 contains results for ten of those measures.
4 
  The national survey data give generally positive results.  Shared capitalism employees are 
more likely to say that they are treated with respect, management-employee relations are good, 
promotions are handled fairly, and worker safety is a high priority with management.  A measure 
that reflects directly on the "management by stress" theories is the employee's perception of stress 
at work, which is not significantly related to the shared capitalism index.  In additional calculations 
not presented here, we examined the positive worker safety result using breakdowns by type of 
shared capitalism program.  In contrast to studies that found no consistent relationship between 
employee ownership and worker safety (Rooney, 1992; Rhodes and Steers, 1981), our data show 
that employee-owners as well as profit-sharers are more likely to report that worker safety is a high 
priority with management. 
  The NBER data, in contrast, show consistently positive results for shared capitalism and 
company treatment.  Shared capitalism is positively linked to perceptions that the company shares 
success with employees and is fair to employees, and to grades workers give to the company on 
sharing information, trustworthiness, and employee relations.  These positive associations become 
smaller in magnitude but remain positive and highly significant when controlling for several 
human resource policies (being in an EI team, training, and job security).   Disaggregating by 
type of shared capitalism program in Table B-2, profit sharing and gainsharing eligibility are 
strongly linked to perceptions that the company shares and is fair to employees (cols. 1-2), while 
                                                 
4 The GSS contains other quality of work life measures which we also analyzed.  The results (available on request) 
were broadly similar across these measures, generally showing positive relationships to profit sharing but not to the 
other shared capitalism measures. 
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profit sharing intensity is strongly associated with all three of the grades (cols. 3-5).  
Employee-owners are also more likely to say the company shares with employees (col. 1), while 
the size of the ownership stake is a strong predictor of each of the five measures.   
Comparisons among employee ownership types show an interesting disparity.  Having 
more employer stock in a 401(k) plan is positively linked to each of the measures, while ESOP 
membership and stake are positively associated with perceptions that the company shares with 
employees, but ESOP membership is negatively associated with the other four perceptions of 
company treatment both with and without company fixed effects.  This is consistent with the 
finding that ESOP members are less likely to be satisfied with their participation in decisions.  
3. Supervision 
  Since incentive programs are one way to reduce the principal-agent problem when 
supervision is difficult or costly, we expect less supervision in shared capitalist environments.  In 
addition, we expect supervisors to be more concerned with maintaining a cooperative atmosphere 
that helps solve the free rider problem than with watching workers work. 
   The GSS asked respondents for views of their supervisors, while the NBER survey asked 
about the degree of supervision.  As seen in item 3 of Table 1, shared capitalism employees are 
more likely to see their supervisors as helpful and caring, while they are less likely to report that 
they are closely supervised both before and after controlling for other HR policies. When broken 
out by type of shared capitalism program in Table B-3, the strongly significant result is that ESOP 
members have greater freedom from supervision (col. 1).  Most of the coefficients on other 
programs are positive, which indicates that each program contributes to the strongly positive 
shared capitalism coefficient in Table 2. 
4. Training  
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  The national GSS data in Table 2 show that shared capitalism employees are more likely to 
say they have the training opportunities they need.  The NBER data show that they report a higher 
likelihood of formal job training in the past year, greater hours of training, and higher levels of 
informal job training from fellow workers, with and without controls for participation in an EI 
team and job security. The breakdowns by plan in Table B-3 show that both training and hours of 
training are higher among workers with profit sharing and employee owners, and are also 
positively linked to size of gain sharing bonus and employee ownership stake.  But training is 
negatively related to the size of stock option value from future potential profits (cols. 2-3).  Among 
the types of employee ownership, training and training hours are highest among ESOP participants 
and those with 401(k) employer stock.   
  The pattern of coefficients is quite different for informal job training from coworkers, 
which suggests that informal job training often substitutes for formal training.  Both stock option 
holding and the size of the stake are positively linked to informal training (Table B-3, col. 4).  
Also, while ESOP members are more likely to get formal training, they are less likely to get 
informal training.  Gainsharing is positively associated with informal training, as is the size of a 
workers’ higher profit-sharing stake.  The broad range of associations between shared capitalism 
and formal and informal training suggest that training is complementary with shared capitalism. 
5.  Pay and benefits  
  Table 1 shows that pay tends to be higher among employees with greater shared capitalist 
forms of pay in both the national and NBER company data.  Employees in the NBER company 
data set with greater shared capitalism are more likely to say that their fixed pay is as at least equal 
to market and rate their total compensation as higher than market and to rate their company as 
higher on wages than others.  Employees in the national shared capitalism survey are more likely  
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to feel they are paid what they deserve.  Employees with greater shared capitalism in both datasets 
rate their companies as better on fringe benefits.   The NBER results are not affected by the 
inclusion of several human resource policies.  When the shared capitalism programs are broken out 
in Table B-4, most of the shared capitalism types are associated with higher fixed pay, though the 
gainsharing bonus intensity and employee ownership stake are inversely related to pay.  There are 
few associations with the employee's rating of fixed pay relative to market (col. 2), but total 
compensation relative to market is higher among gainsharers and those with higher profit sharing 
benefits when they receive profit sharing, have bigger profit sharing bonuses, and are 
employee-owners through ESPP's and 401(k) plans (cols. 4-5).  The pay and benefit results 
indicate that shared capitalism does not generally substitute for fixed pay or other benefits. This 
rejects a simple compensating differences story of shared capitalist modes of pay, although the 
higher pay may help compensate for greater effort or other forms of costly behavior. 
6.  Co-worker Relations 
  Does shared capitalism help or hurt relations with fellow workers?  Employees with greater 
shared capitalism in the GSS dataset are more likely to report that their co-workers can be relied on 
for help when needed, and that their co-workers take a personal interest in them.  Such helpfulness 
and interest presumably make work more pleasant and increase employee welfare directly, but 
may also lay the foundation for cooperation among employees that can increase workplace 
performance (explored in the companion papers by Freeman, Kruse, and Blasi 2008, and Blasi et 
al. 2008). 
6.  Job Security  
  Shared capitalism is associated with greater job security.  Employees higher in the shared 
capitalist index report a lower likelihood of losing their jobs, and in the national data they report a  
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lower likelihood of being laid off in the past year.  The NBER results are maintained when 
controlling for participation in an EI team and receipt of training.  When broken out by shared 
capitalism policy, both profit sharing eligibility and the size of the profit share are linked to greater 
job security (Table B-5, col. 1).   Owning employer stock, and the size of the ownership stake and 
stock option value, are also positively associated with job security.  The breakdowns by type of 
employee ownership indicate that job security is highest among ESOP participants and those 
holding 401(k) employer stock, and those with greater holdings in both of those plans.  The 
findings that job security is greater for employee-owners than for other workers is consistent with 
prior research on the employment stability and company survival of employee ownership firms 
(Blair et al., 2000, Park et al., 2004).   
7.  Job satisfaction 
 
  Job satisfaction is positively linked to the shared capitalism index in both the national and 
NBER company data, but the result is statistically significant only in the NBER data.  This NBER 
result disappears, however, when controlling for the human resource policies.  The strong 
association between shared capitalism and these human resource policies indicates that there may 
be important complementarities, which we explore in Table 2.  When the policies are broken out in 
Table B-5, job satisfaction is positively associated with the size of the profit sharing and 
gainsharing bonuses, and with participation in an ESOP when company fixed effects are removed 
(col. 2).  The positive ESOP result on job satisfaction presumably reflects the positive effects of 
ESOP membership on training, freedom from supervision, rating of benefits, and job security 
overpowering ESOP participants' lower satisfaction with participation in decisions (Table B-1) 
and their lower ratings for the company on several measures (Table B-2).  
Complementarities  
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  Both theory and evidence support the idea that there may be important complementarities 
among human resource policies in affecting workplace performance (e.g., Levine and Tyson, 
1990; Huselid, 1995; Ichniowski et al., 1996).  These complementarities may also affect employee 
outcomes:  for example, job satisfaction may be increased more by combining shared capitalism 
with employee involvement and training than by the sum of the policies in isolation.   
  Measurement of high-performance human resource policies varies among studies.  One 
analysis divides them into seven broad categories: group incentive pay, teamwork/employee 
involvement, training, employment security, information sharing, flexible job assignment, and 
recruitment and selection (Ichniowski et al., 1997).  The NBER surveys contain measures of each 
of these, but not for every company.
5 For our investigation of complementarities, we created a 
human resource policy index that gives one point each for being in an employee involvement team, 
receiving formal training in the past 12 months, and having high job security, and we then interact 
this index with the shared capitalism index.
6   
  Shared capitalism may also interact with supervision in affecting employee outcomes.  
Shared capitalist policies may, as noted, help substitute for close supervision of workers by 
providing greater incentives for workers to work hard and monitor their co-workers.  The finding 
that shared capitalism is associated with greater freedom from supervision lends support to this 
idea (Table 1).  When shared capitalist policies are combined with close supervision, however, the 
results may be negative.  If workers are not given much latitude in how they do their work, shared 
                                                 
5 Flexible job assignment was measured as job rotation at six companies, and rigorous selection was measured at one 
large company. 
6   We also experimented with indices using measures of information sharing, job rotation, and rigorous selection, 
producing a similar pattern of results.  Here we use the index based only on employee involvement, training, and job 
security since the sample sizes are smaller for job rotation and rigorous selection, and the grade of the company on 
sharing information reflects an employee evaluation of the policy's success (highly correlated with evaluations of the 
company on other dimensions), rather than the existence of a policy.  
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capitalist policies may serve mainly to shift financial risk to workers, resulting in more negative 
worker behaviour and attitudes.  At a minimum, combining shared capitalism with close 
supervision sends a mixed message to employees:  "We want you to work harder and be more 
committed to the company because of your (profit share/employer stock/stock options), but we're 
still going to keep a close eye on you."  Workers may not respond well to this mixed message. 
  Table 2 assesses interactions between the shared capitalism index and other workplace 
policies to assess possible complementarities in effects on employee attitudes.  The statistical 
analysis shows that shared capitalism interacts with high performance policies and supervision in 
affecting a number of employee outcomes.
7  The interaction with high performance policies shows  
that employees are especially likely to have high participation, and to be satisfied with their 
participation, when they are covered by both shared capitalist and high performance policies (col. 
3).  The interaction is also positive with informal training and overall job satisfaction.  The 
interaction is negative, however, on perceptions of company sharing, fairness, and benefits; the 
coefficients indicate that shared capitalism has a positive effect both for those with and without 
high performance policies, but has a more positive effect for those who are not also covered by 
high performance policies.  
  The pattern is more straightforward with respect to supervision:  the combination of shared 
capitalism with close supervision produces a more negative outcome in almost every case (col. 5).  
The main effect of close supervision is generally positive (col. 4), indicating that in the absence of 
shared capitalism, having close supervision may often be a good thing (e.g., giving workers a 
                                                 
7   When the high performance index included the outcome being predicted, that item was deleted from the high 
performance index (e.g., employee involvement was deleted from the high performance index in predicting 
participation in an employee involvement team). 
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better sense of what they are supposed to do).  But the main effect is counteracted in most cases, 
however, by the negative shared capitalism interaction—e.g., the predicted overall effect of 
increased supervision on perceptions of company fairness is negative whenever the shared 
capitalism index is 2 or greater.  
  The contingent effects of shared capitalism on job satisfaction are illustrated in Figure 1, 
which uses the regression results from Table 2.  When workers are covered by high performance 
policies and have low or average levels of supervision, the effects of increased shared capitalism 
are positive (top two lines).  When they are not covered by high-performance policies, and/or are 
very closely supervised, the effects of shared capitalism are slightly or very negative (bottom four 
lines).  While the overall relationship between shared capitalism and job satisfaction is close to 
zero after controlling for other policies (Table 1), these results illustrate that the other policies can 
greatly condition the effects of shared capitalism. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  Do workers gain by sharing?  The evidence generally supports an answer of "yes", with 
some caveats.  Both the national and NBER company data indicate that shared capitalism is 
positively linked to participation in decisions, evaluations of company climate and employee 
treatment, perceptions of helpfulness by supervisors, lower levels of supervision, and higher levels 
of training, pay and benefits, job security, and job satisfaction.  Almost all of these relationships 
remain strong when controlling for other human resource policies.  This rejects the "management 
by stress" theories of work innovation. 
  When broken out by type of shared capitalist program, profit sharing was most consistently 
linked to the positive outcomes, although gainsharing, stock options, and employee ownership also  
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affect some outcomes positively.  In many cases the positive effect was tied to simply being 
covered by a policy (e.g., being eligible for profit sharing, or being an employee-owner), but there 
were also many cases in which the effect was tied to the size of the financial stake involved (size of 
most recent bonus, or value of employer stock or stock options). 
  Estimated negative relations between some aspects of shared capitalism and some 
outcomes are also informative about how this form of financial sharing operates.  In particular, 
while being a member of an ESOP was linked to a number of positive outcomes (participation in 
decisions, perception that the company shares, freedom from supervision, formal training, pay and 
benefit levels, job security, and job satisfaction), ESOP members also had lower satisfaction with 
participation in decisions and lower ratings of the company on fairness, trustworthiness, and 
employee relations.  One possible reason is that employee-owners may be frustrated by unfulfilled 
desires for greater participation in decisions (above the higher levels they already have).  Another 
possible reason is that some ESOP accounts have too little stock to be meaningful and some 
employees may have negative attitudes when they are called owners but have very little 
ownership.  The importance of the ownership stake is highlighted by the finding that satisfaction 
with participation rises with the value of employee-owned stock as a percent of pay.  The 
dynamics of employee ownership may work differently for ESOPs than for other forms of 
ownership:  it is the only form where all eligible workers are automatically enrolled and called 
owners even with miniscule accounts. 
  Finally, our data reveals potentially important complementarities of shared capitalism with 
other workplace policies, particularly with high performance work policies and closeness of 
supervision.  Those who are covered by the combination of high-performance policies with shared 
capitalism are most likely to report high participation in decisions, satisfaction with participation,  
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and overall job satisfaction.  The combination of close supervision with shared capitalism, 
however, has negative effects on almost every outcome. 
  Overall, our findings are consistent with theories that stress the linkage between group 
incentive pay systems and other labor and personnel relations policies.  Taken as a package, a high 
performance work system involves greater participation, higher quality of supervision, more 
formal training, better wages and benefits, higher job satisfaction, and better job security.  
Employers who are concerned about company performance, and workers who are concerned about 
the quality of their working life, have reasons to be interested in this package.  Our findings that 
shared capitalist programs are often associated with these policies and outcomes indicate that there 
is good potential for workers to gain through sharing.  
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Shared capitalism index (GSS):  8-point index with one point each for profit sharing 
eligibility, gain sharing eligibility, owning any company stock, holding any stock options, 
receiving a profit sharing bonus in the past year, receiving a gain sharing bonus in the past 
year, having an above-median profit- and gain sharing bonus as a percent of pay, and 
having an above-median company stock holding as a percent of pay.  Mean=1.48, 
s.d.=2.14, n=1919 
 
Shared capitalism index (NBER):  10-point index with all items in GS index, plus one 
point each for receiving a stock option grant in the past year, and having above-median 
stock option holdings as a percent of pay.  Mean=3.60, s.d.=2.65, n=40522 
 
Profit sharing (GSS and NBER):  "In your job are you eligible for any type of 
performance-based pay, such as individual or group bonuses, or any type of profit-sharing?  
What does the size of these performance-based payments depend on?  Company profits or 
performance" (0=no, 1=yes), GSS mean=.372, n=2184, NBER mean=.713, n=41018 
 
Profit sharing as % of pay (GSS and NBER):  If "yes" to profit sharing, answer to "What 
was the approximate total dollar value of the payment(s) you received [in the most recent 
year of bonuses]?" divided by basepay+overtime, otherwise 0.  GSS mean=.024, s.d.=.066, 
n=1944, NBER mean=.068, s.d.=.124, n=40485 
 
Gainsharing (GSS and NBER):  "In your job are you eligible for any type of 
performance-based pay, such as individual or group bonuses, or any type of profit-sharing?  
What does the size of these performance-based payments depend on?  Workgroup or 
department performance" (0=no, 1=yes), GSS mean=.257, n=2184, NBER mean=.207, 
n=41023 
 
Gainsharing as % of pay (GSS and NBER):  If "yes" to gainsharing, answer to "What 
was the approximate total dollar value of the payment(s) you received [in the most recent 
year of bonuses]?" divided by basepay+overtime, otherwise 0. GSS mean=.017, s.d.=.061, 
n=2013, NBER mean=.033, s.d.=.106, n=40767 
 
Individual bonus (GSS and NBER):  "In your job are you eligible for any type of 
performance-based pay, such as individual or group bonuses, or any type of profit-sharing?  
What does the size of these performance-based payments depend on?  Individual 
performance" (0=no, 1=yes).  GSS mean=.290, n=2184, NBER mean=.290, n=41019 
 
Individual bonus as % of pay (NBER):  If "yes" to individual bonus, answer to "What 
was the approximate total dollar value of the payment(s) you received [in the most recent 




Hold employer stock (GSS):  "Do you own any shares of stock in the company where you 
now work, either directly or through some type of retirement or stock plan?" (0=no, 
1=yes), mean=.212, n=2202 
 
Employer stock as % of pay (GSS):  If "yes" to "hold employer stock," answer to "Please 
give a general estimate of how much cash you would get if all this stock were sold today?" 
divided by annual earnings, otherwise 0, mean=.111, s.d.=.977, n=2186 
   
Hold employer stock (NBER):  Any employer stock held through ESOP, Employee Stock 
Purchase Plan, 401(k), exercised stock options, or open market purchases (0=no, 1=yes), 
mean=.640, n=41206 
 
Employer stock as % of pay (NBER):  If "yes" to "Hold employer stock," the sum of 
answers to questions about value of stock held in different plans, divided by 
basepay+overtime, otherwise 0. NBER mean=.398, s.d.=.808, n=40367 
 
Hold stock options (GSS and NBER):  "Do you currently hold any stock options in your 
company (vested or unvested)?" (0=no, 1=yes), GSS mean=.123, n=2188, NBER 
mean=.219, n=41166. 
 
Stock options as % of pay (NBER):  If "yes" to "Hold stock options," the sum of answers 
to questions about value of vested and unvested stock, divided by basepay+overtime, 
otherwise 0. NBER mean=.395, s.d.=1.490, n=40922 
 
ESOP (NBER):  Participant in ESOP (0=no, 1=yes),  mean=.081, n=41109 
 
ESOP stock as % of pay (NBER):  Employer stock held in ESOP, divided by 
basepay+overtime, otherwise 0,  mean=.067, s.d.=.417, n=41002 
 
ESPP (NBER):  Hold stock purchased through Employee Stock Purchase Plan (0=no, 
1=yes),  mean=.176, n=41169 
 
ESPP stock as % of pay (NBER):  Employer stock held in Employee Stock Purchase 
Plan, divided by basepay+overtime, otherwise 0,  mean=.078, s.d.=.304, n=41168 
 
401(k) stock (NBER):  Hold employer stock in 401(k) plan (0=no, 1=yes),  mean=.335, 
n=40885 
 
401(k) stock as % of pay (NBER):  Employer stock held in 401(k) plan, divided by 
basepay+overtime, otherwise 0,  mean=.189, s.d.=.525, n=40730 
 
Stock from exercised options as % of pay (NBER):  Employer stock held from exercised 
options, divided by basepay+overtime, otherwise 0,  mean=.052, s.d.=.396, n=40956 
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Stock from exercised options (NBER):  Hold employer stock from exercised options 
(0=no, 1=yes),  mean=.050, n=41032 
 
Open mkt. stock as % of pay (NBER):  Employer stock purchased on open market, 
divided by basepay+overtime, otherwise 0,  mean=.019, s.d.=.165, n=41144 
 
Open mkt. stock (NBER):  Hold stock purchased on open market (0=no, 1=yes),  
mean=.073, n=41145 
 
EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONS       
 
Lot of say on job (GSS): "I have a lot of say about what happens on my job" (1-4 scale, 
1=strongly disagree, 4=strongly agree), mean=2.83, s.d.=.88, n=2204     
     
Make decisions with others (GSS): "In your job, how often do you take part with others 
in making decisions that affect you?" (1-4 scale, 1=never, 4=often), mean=3.08, s.d.=.93, 
n=2211  
     
Help set way things done on job (GSS): "How often do you participate with others in 
helping set the way things are done on your job?" (1-4 scale, 1=never, 4=often), 
mean=3.14, s.d.=.92, n=2210 
     
Freedom in doing work (GSS): "I am given a lot of freedom to decide how to do my own 
work" (1-4 scale, 1=not at all true, 4=very true)  , mean=3.31, s.d.=.85, n=2208 
     
Involved in job decisions (NBER):  "How much involvement and direct influence do 
YOU have in: Deciding HOW to do your job and organize the work" (1-4 scale, 1=none, 
4=a lot), mean=3.27, s.d.=.87, n=40750 
 
Involved in department goals (NBER):  "How much involvement and direct influence do 
YOU have in:  Setting GOALS for your work group or department" (1-4 scale, 1=none, 
4=a lot), mean=2.59, s.d.=1.04, n=40594 
 
Involved in company decisions (NBER):  "How much involvement and direct influence 
do YOU have in: Overall company decisions" (1-4 scale, 1=none, 4=a lot), mean=1.71, 
s.d.=.86, n=40520 
 
In EI team (NBER):  " Some companies have organized workplace decision-making in 
ways to get more employee input and involvement.  Are you personally involved in any 
team, committee or task force that addresses issues such as product quality, cost cutting, 
productivity, health and safety, or other workplace issues?" (0=no, 1=yes), mean=.35, 
n=40122 
 
Satisfied with participation (NBER):  "Overall, how satisfied are you with the influence 
you have in company decisions that affect your job and work life?" (1-4 scale, 1=not at all  
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Supervisor helpful (GSS): "My supervisor is helpful to me in getting the job done" (1-4 
scale, 1=not at all true, 4=very true), mean=3.26, s.d.=.88, n=2197    
     
Supervisor cares (GSS):  "My supervisor is concerned about the welfare of those under 
him or her" (1-4 scale, 1=not at all true, 4=very true), mean=3.26, s.d.=.88, n=2185 
     
Free from supervision (NBER): "Are you closely supervised, or do you work fairly 
independently of close supervision?" (0-10 scale, 0=closely supervised, 10=independent of 
close supervision), mean=6.65, s.d.=2.63, n=40845     
      
COMPANY TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEES     
      
Treated with respect (GSS): "At the place where I work, I am treated with respect" (1-4 
scale, 1=strongly disagree, 4=strongly agree), mean=3.27, s.d.=.68, n=2209   
     
Mgt.-ee relations (GSS): "In general, how would you describe relations in your work 
place between management and employees?" (1-5 scale, 1=very bad, 5=very good), 
mean=3.95, s.d.=.99, n=2205 
       
Promotions handled fairly (GSS): "Promotions are handled fairly" (1-4 scale, 1=not at all 
true, 4=very true), mean=2.84, s.d.=.98, n=2083   
     
Worker safety is high priority (GSS): "The safety of workers is a high priority with 
management where I work" (1-4 scale, 1=not at all true, 4=very true), mean=3.31, s.d.=.70, 
n=2194 
 
Stress (GSS):  "How often do you find your work stressful?" (1-5 scale, 1=always, 
5=never), mean=3.08, s.d.=1.03, n=2209 
       
Employees share when co. does well (NBER):  "When the company does well, 
employees share the benefits" (1-7 scale, 1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree), 
mean=5.00, s.d.=1.78, n=40676 
  
Company fair to employees (NBER): "Overall, this company is fair to its employees"  
(1-7 scale, 1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree), mean=4.75, s.d.=1.71, n=40632 
  
Co. grade on ee. relations (NBER):  "If you were to rate how well this company takes care 
of workers on a scale similar to school grades, what grade would you give in these areas? 
Overall relations with employees" (0-4 scale, 0=F, 4=A), mean=2.45, s.d.=1.07, n=40464  
 
Co. grade on sharing info (NBER):  "If you were to rate how well this company takes  
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care of workers on a scale similar to school grades, what grade would you give in these 
areas? Sharing information with employees" (0-4 scale, 0=F, 4=A), mean=2.44, s.d.=1.11, 
n=40523 
 
Co. grade on trustworthy (NBER):  "If you were to rate how well this company takes 
care of workers on a scale similar to school grades, what grade would you give in these 
areas? Trustworthiness in keeping its promises" (0-4 scale, 0=F, 4=A), mean=2.33, 
s.d.=1.15, n=40385 
 
TRAINING     
 
Training opportunities (GSS): "I have the training opportunities I need to perform my job 
safely and competently" (1-4 scale, 1=not at all true, 4=very true), mean=3.48, s.d.=.74, 
n=2204 
       
Formal training (NBER): "In the last 12 months have you received any formal training 
from your current employer, such as in classes or seminars sponsored by the employer?" 
(0=no, 1=yes), mean=.564, n=40460 
     
Training hours (NBER):  If "yes" to formal training, answer to "About how many hours of 
formal training have you received in the last 12 months?  If "no" to formal training, coded 
as 0.  Mean=17.80, s.d.=40.38, n=39426 
 
Informal training (NBER): "To what extent have fellow employees taught you job skills, 
problem solving, short cuts, or other ways to improve your work, on an informal basis?" 
(1-4 scale, 1=not at all, 4=to a great extent), mean=2.89, s.d.=.85, n=40651     
 
PAY AND BENEFITS 
 
Yearly earnings (GSS):  Total yearly earnings from main job (natural log) , mean=10.12, 
s.d.=1.05, n=1888     
     
Paid what you deserve (GSS):  "How fair is what you earn on your job in comparison to 
others doing the same type of work you do?"  (1-5 scale, 1=much less than what you 
deserve, 5=much more than you deserve), mean=3.43, s.d.=.86, n=2171   
     
Fringe benefits good (GSS): "My fringe benefits are good" (1-4 scale, 1=not at all true, 
4=very true), mean=2.87, s.d.=1.09, n=2198  
     
Fixed pay (NBER):  Yearly base pay+overtime (natural log), mean=10.710, s.d.=.783, 
n=31162 
     
Fixed pay difference from mkt. (NBER):  "Do you believe your fixed annual wages are 
higher or lower than those of employees with similar experience and job descriptions in 
other companies in your region?  By what percent is it higher or lower?" mean=-4.76,  
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s.d.=17.10, n=31793 
     
Total comp. difference from mkt. (NBER):  "Do you believe your total compensation is 
higher or lower than those of employees with similar experience and job descriptions in 
other companies in your region?  By what percent is it higher or lower?" mean=-2.07, 
s.d.=18.81, n=30440 
     
Grade of co. on wages (NBER):  "If you were to rate how well this company takes care of 
workers on a scale similar to school grades, what grade would you give in these areas? 
Paying good wages" (0-4 scale, 0=F, 4=A), mean=2.54, s.d.=1.06, n=40679 
     
Grade of co. on benefits (NBER):  "If you were to rate how well this company takes care 
of workers on a scale similar to school grades, what grade would you give in these areas? 
Giving fair benefits to workers" (0-4 scale, 0=F, 4=A), mean=2.64, s.d.=1.08, n=40611 




Co-workers can be relied on for help (GSS):  “The people I work with can be relied on 
when I need help.” (1-4 scale, 1=not at all true, 4=very true), mean=3.37, s.d.=.75, n=2207 
 
Co-workers take personal interest in me (GSS):  “The people I work with take a 





Not likely to lose job (GSS and NBER): "Thinking about the next twelve months, how 
likely do you think it is that you will lose your job or be laid off?" (1-4 scale, 1=not at all 
likely, 4=very likely), GSS mean=3.27, s.d.=.87, n=2198, NBER mean=3.09, s.d.=.76, 
n=38510    
      
Not laid off in past year (GSS): "Were you laid off your main job at any time in the last 




GSS measure: "All in all, how satisfied would you say you are with your job?" (1-4 scale, 
1=not at all satisfied, 4=very satisfied), mean=3.27, s.d.=.80, n=1656     
 
NBER measure: "How satisfied are you in your job?" (1-7 scale, 1=completely 
dissatisfied, 7=completely satisfied), mean=5.04, s.d.=1.29, n=40842     






High performance policies:  Additive index of: 
i)  Employee involvement team:  "Some companies have organized workplace 
decision-making in ways to get more employee input and involvement.  Are 
you personally involved in any team, committee or task force that addresses 
issues such as product quality, cost cutting, productivity, health and safety, 
or other workplace issues?" (0=no, 1=yes), mean=.347, n=40122 
 
ii) Formal training: "In the last 12 months have you received any formal training 
from your current employer, such as in classes or seminars sponsored by the 
employer?" (0=no, 1=yes), mean=.564, n=40460 
 
iii) Job security: "Thinking about the next twelve months, how likely do you think 
it is that you will lose your job or be laid off?" (coded for scale as 0=very likely 
or fairly likely, 1=not too likely or not at all likely), mean=.843, n=38510 
  Index mean=1.77, s.d.=.86, n=37125 
 
 Closely  supervised: "Are you closely supervised, or do you work fairly independently of 
close supervision?" (0-10 scale, 0=independent of close supervision, 10= closely 
supervised), mean=3.35, s.d.=2.63, n=40845    
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APPENDIX B:  The shared capitalist thermometer index 
  As a first step in assessing the relation of shared capitalism to employee outcomes, we 
constructed a thermometer-style index of shared capitalism.  This index assigns one point each 
when the worker was covered by any of the shared capitalist forms of compensation about which 
the survey asked, with additional points for recent bonuses or grants, and for large bonuses or stock 
holdings.  For questions with a continuous numeric answer, we gave the item a value of 1 if the 
respondent had a value greater than the median value.  Because there is no natural ordering of 
shared capitalist systems in the sense that a firm first introduces profit-sharing, then adds employee 
ownership, and then gain-sharing, the index is not a Guttman scale.  It is a simple summated rating 
(Bartholomew et al, 2002; Bartholomew, 1996), using dichotomous scoring. 
  In the GSS, there are eight variables in the index: profit sharing eligibility, gain sharing 
eligibility, owning any company stock, holding stock options, receiving a profit sharing bonus in 
the past year, receiving a gain sharing bonus in the past year, having an above-median profit- and 
gain sharing bonus as a percent of pay, and having an above-median company stock holding as a 
percent of pay.  In the NBER data there are ten variables in the index: all of the above items plus 
one point each for receiving a stock option grant in the past year, and having above-median stock 
option holdings (including unvested options if they could be exercised today) as a percent of pay.   
  Indices of this style have both advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, they 
provide a quick and ready measure of the extent of shared capitalist arrangements that makes it 
easy to compare results across surveys and to summarize the broad thrust of findings.  Since our 
firm surveys covered only firms with some shared capitalist arrangements, the index allows us to 
differentiate workers with differing degrees of incentive to their firm’s programs.  On the negative 
side, the index treats different programs the same even though they potentially have different  
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effects on particular outcomes.  It postulates a single scale with equal weights rather than using 
factor analysis or other statistical modelling to obtain weights for given factors.   To deal with 
these problems, we estimated the relationship of the outcomes to the different types of shared 
capitalism, introduced as dummy or continuous variables in regressions.
8  Tables B-1 to B-5 give 
the results of those calculations.  By comparing the results in the appendix tables with those in the 
text, we can assess the loss of information due to the amalgamation of the measures into a single 
index.  
  Figure B1 shows the distribution of our shared capitalism index in the GSS.  This survey 
estimates that 40% of US workers have some form of shared capitalist program.  This estimate is 
close to that obtained by Dube and Freeman in the WRPS.  The mean score of the index is 1.48 – a 
figure greatly affected by the substantial number of workers without shared capitalism systems.  
Conditional on having a program, most workers report scores in the range of 2 to 5, with 6% 
reporting scores of 6 or greater.  Figure B2 gives the distribution of the index in the NBER survey 
data.  It also shows a non-normal distribution, with the most common scores as 2 to 4 but a sizeable 
number of workers scoring 7 or above.  There is sufficient variation in the index to differentiate the 
extent of the shared capitalist “treatment” on workers.
                                                 
8 There are statistical techniques to deal with the formation of latent variable indices from questions of the sort that we 





TABLE 1:  Relation of Eight Employee Outcomes to Shared Capitalist Compensation               
               
Each row represents results of separate regression.                       
         Coeff. (s.e.) of             
         shared capitalism  Job and      Job    
  Dependent  variables    Index      demog. EI  team Training security  N 
1. PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONS             
 National  data             
    Lot of say about what happens on job (1-4 scale)  0.064 *** (0.014)  x      1677
    Take part with others in making decisions (1-4 scale)  0.100 *** (0.015)  x      1680
    Participate with others in setting way things are done (1-4 scale)  0.084 *** (0.015)  x      1679
    Lot of freedom to decide how to do work (1-4 scale)  0.053 *** (0.015)  x      1680
                   
  NBER company data             
    Part. in job decisions (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)  0.039 *** (0.004)  x      39117
        0.019 *** (0.005)  x x x x  35596
    Part. in group/dept. goals (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)     0.020 *** (0.004)  x      38997
        0.004 **  (0.004)  x x x x  35501
    Part. in company decisions (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)     0.012 *** (0.004)  x      38942
          -0.002   (0.004)  x x x x  35462
    In employee involvement team (0-1)(linear prob.)  0.020 *** (0.002)  x      38576
        0.017 *** (0.002) x    x  x  35838
    Satisfaction with participation (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)  0.016 *** (0.004)  x      38964
          -0.002   (0.004)  x x x x  35494
2. COMPANY TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEES                 
 National  data              
    Am treated with respect at work (1-4 scale)(ordered  probit)  0.029 *  (0.015)  x      1679
    Mgt-employee relations (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)  0.036 *** (0.014)  x      1677
    Promotions are handled fairly (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)  0.042 *** (0.014)  x      1610
    Worker safety is high priority with mgt. (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)  0.067 *** (0.015)  x      1671
    Lack of stress at work (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)  0.008   (0.013)  x        1681
                    
  NBER company data              




        0.104 *** (0.006)  x x x x  35592
    Co. is fair to ees. (1-7 scale)(OLS)  0.063 *** (0.006)  x      39030
    0.038 ***  (0.006)  x x x x  35548
    Grade of co. on sharing info (0-4 scale)(OLS)  0.023 *** (0.004)  x      38932
    0.008 **  (0.004)  x x x x  35452
    Grade of co. on trustworthiness (0-4 scale)(OLS)  0.029 *** (0.004)  x      38821
    0.012 *** (0.004)  x x x x  35394
    Grade of co. on employee relations (0-4 scale)(OLS)  0.023 *** (0.004)  x      38884
        0.008 **  (0.004)  x x x x  35420
3.  SUPERVISION             
 National  data             
    Supervisor is helpful to me (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)  0.038 *** (0.015)  x      1675
  
Supervisor cares about welfare of those under him or her (1-4 
scale)(ordered probit)  0.055 *** (0.015)  x      1667
                      
  NBER company data              
    Freedom from close supervision (0-10 scale)(OLS)  0.039 *** (0.009)  x      39488
        0.034 *** (0.009)  x x x x  35838
4.  TRAINING              
 National  data              
    Have training opportunities I need  0.045 *** (0.016)  x      1678
  NBER company data              
    Formal job training in past 12 mos. (0-1)(OLS)  0.019 *** (0.002)  x      38863
        0.015 *** (0.002) x  x    x  35838
    Hours of training in past 12 mos. (Tobit)  2.289 *** (0.226)  x      37905
        1.838 *** (0.236) x  x    x  34974
    Informal job training from co-workers (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)  0.022 *** (0.004)  x      39033
        0.009 *** (0.004)  x x x x  35597
5.  PAY  AND  BENEFITS             
 National  data             
    Yearly earnings (natural logarithm)(OLS)  0.092 *** (0.009)  x      1681
    Paid what you deserve (1-5 scale)(ordered probit)  0.059 *** (0.013)  x      1841
    Fringe benefits are good (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)  0.117 *** (0.014)  x      1860




  NBER company data             
    Fixed pay (natural logarithm)(OLS)  0.023 *** (0.002)  x      30122
        0.024 *** (0.002)  x x x x  28324
    Fixed pay % diff. from market (OLS)  0.094   (0.067)  x      30782
          0.051   (0.070)  x x x x  28152
    Total compensation % diff. from market (OLS)  0.511 *** (0.072)    x      29569
        0.468 *** (0.075)  x x x x  27199
    Grade of co. on wages (0-4 scale)(OLS)  0.025 *** (0.004)  x      39068
        0.018 *** (0.004)  x x x x  35564
    Grade of co. on benefits (0-4 scale)(OLS)  0.034 *** (0.004)  x      39011
        0.024 *** (0.004)  x x x x  35519
6. CO-WORKER RELATIONS             
     National data             
           Co-workers can be relied on for help  0.030 **  (0.015)  x      1680
           Co-workers take personal interest in me  0.047 *** (0.015)  x      1675
             
7. JOB SECURITY               
 National  data             
    Not likely to lose job (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)  0.047 *** (0.015)  x      1676
    Not laid off in past year (0-1 dummy)  0.012 *** (0.003)  x      1681
  NBER company data             
    Not likely to lose job (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)  0.054 *** (0.004)  x      37052
        0.051 *** (0.004)  x x x    35838
8.  JOB  SATISFACTION             
 National  data             
    Job satisfaction (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)  0.022   (0.018)  x      1262
  NBER company data             
    Job satisfaction (1-7 scale)(OLS)  0.015 *** (0.005)  x      39192
           -0.004    (0.005)  x  x  x  x  35685
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01    Coefficients in bold are significant at p<.05             
See Appendix A for variable definitions and descriptive  statistics            
Job and demographic controls include age, sex, race, tenure, occupation, earnings, full-time status, and ease of seeing co-workers for all regressions, plus work in a team for national 
regressions, and management level, supervisory status, disability status, closeness of supervision, payment on an hourly rate, and company fixed effects  for the NBER company 




TABLE 2:  Complementarities of Shared Capitalist Compensation in Affecting Employee Outcomes 
 
Each row represents results of a separate regression, with standard errors in parentheses underneath.          
        Shared      High performance policies  Closely supervised   
     capitalism       Shared  cap.       Shared  cap.  
     base  effect  Base  effect   Interaction  Base  effect interaction  
Dependent variables  (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)    
PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONS                   
    Part. in job decisions (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)  0.056 *** 0.212  *** 0.009  *** -0.037 *** -0.015  ***
        (0.008)   (0.013)   (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.001)  
    Part. in group/dept. goals (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)    0.017 **  0.238  *** 0.013  *** 0.008 *  -0.011  ***
        (0.007)   (0.013)   (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.001)  
    Part. in company decisions (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)    -0.020 **  0.211  *** 0.021  *** 0.030 *** -0.007  ***
        (0.008)   (0.013)   (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.001)  
    In employee involvement team (0-1)(linear prob.)  0.011 *** 0.070  *** 0.006  *** 0.002   -0.001   
        (0.003)   (0.007)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.000)  
    Satisfaction with participation (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)  -0.010   0.251  *** 0.024  *** 0.019 *** -0.010  ***
        (0.007)   (0.013)   (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.001)  
COMPANY TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEES                     
    When co. does well, ees. share benefits (1-7 scale)(OLS)  0.187 *** 0.396  *** -0.031 *** 0.013 **  -0.008 ***
      (0.011)   (0.018)    (0.004)   (0.006)   (0.001)  
    Co. is fair to ees. (1-7 scale)(OLS)  0.090 *** 0.422  *** -0.010 *** 0.017 *** -0.010 ***
      (0.010)   (0.017)    (0.004)   (0.006)   (0.001)  
    Grade of co. on sharing info (0-4 scale)(OLS)  0.043 *** 0.272  *** -0.002   0.029 *** -0.010 ***
      (0.007)   (0.012)    (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.001)  
    Grade of co. on trustworthiness (0-4 scale)(OLS)  0.050 *** 0.287  *** -0.004    0.028 *** -0.010 ***
      (0.007)   (0.012)    (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.001)  
    Grade of co. on employee relations (0-4 scale)(OLS) 0.043 *** 0.257  *** 0.000     0.029 *** -0.011 ***
      (0.007)   (0.011)    (0.002)   (0.004)   (0.001)  
SUPERVISION                 
    Freedom from close supervision (0-10  scale)(OLS)  0.017   0.031    0.012        
        (0.014)   (0.027)    (0.006)        
T R A I N I N G                    




      (0.003)   (0.007)    (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.000)  
    Hours of training in past 12 mos. (Tobit)  2.047 *** 11.048  *** 0.076    0.344    -0.106 * 
      (0.398)   (1.002)    (0.209)   (0.239)   (0.055)  
    Informal job training from co-workers (1-4 scale)(ordered probit) 0.005   0.188  *** 0.008 *** 0.030 *** -0.004 ***
      (0.007)   (0.012)    (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.001)  
PAY  AND  BENEFITS                 
    Fixed pay (natural logarithm)(OLS)  0.028 *** 0.017  *** -0.001    -0.009 *** -0.001 * 
      (0.003)   (0.005)    (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.000)  
    Fixed pay % diff. from market (OLS) 0.249 **  0.870  *** 0.012     0.297 *** -0.073 ***
      (0.124)   (0.218)    (0.047)   (0.071)   (0.016)  
    Total compensation % diff. from market (OLS)  0.558 *** 0.771  *** 0.094 *  0.184 **  -0.084 ***
      (0.134)   (0.239)    (0.050)   (0.078)   (0.018)  
    Grade of co. on wages (0-4 scale)(OLS)  0.041 *** 0.141  *** -0.002    0.007 **  -0.006 ***
      (0.007)   (0.011)    (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.001)  
    Grade of co. on benefits (0-4 scale)(OLS) 0.057 *** 0.187  *** -0.008 *** 0.007 *  -0.006 ***
      (0.007)   (0.011)    (0.002)   (0.004)   (0.001)  
JOB  SECURITY                     
    Not likely to lose job (1-4 scale)(ordered probit)  0.065 *** 0.098  *** 0.002    -0.029 *** -0.005 ***
      (0.006)   (0.015)    (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.001)  
JOB  SATISFACTION                 
    Job satisfaction (1-7 scale)(OLS)  -0.007   0.264  *** 0.019 *** 0.001   -0.009 ***
           (0.008)    (0.014)     (0.003)    (0.004)    (0.001)   
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01                         
See Appendix A for variable definitions and descriptive  statistics               
Based on NBER company data.  Job and demographic controls include age, sex, race, tenure, occupation, earnings, full-time status, management level, supervisory status, disability 




Table A-1: Prevalence of Shared Capitalism Programs 
 
General NBER      Sample sizes
Social company
Survey dataset GSS NBER
2002-2006
Bonus eligibility
Profit sharing  35.9% 71.3% 2386 41018
Gainsharing 24.9% 20.7% 2386 41023
Size of most recent bonus, if eligible for any
Mean dollar value $6,265 $11,329 693 26113
Median dollar value $1,500 $2,000 693 26113
Mean % of pay 8.9% 12.1% 645 22019
Median % of pay 4.6% 5.7% 645 22019
Employee ownership
Own employer stock in any form 19.4% 64.0% 2406 41206
Own employer stock through:
Employee Stock Ownership Plan 8.1% 41109
Employee Stock Purchase Plan 17.6% 40990
401(k) plan 33.5% 40885
Exercising options and keeping stock 5.0% 41032
Open market purchase 7.3% 41145
Value of employer stock, if own stock
Dollar value:  Mean $63,130 $60,078 318 25447
                   Median $10,000 $14,375 318 25447
% of pay:     Mean 81.7% 65.0% 302 22715
                   Median 23.0% 30.6% 302 22715
% of wealth:  Mean 19.6% 23141
                   Median 10.0% 23141
Stock options
Currently hold stock options 11.3% 21.9% 2392 41166
Ever granted stock options 22.3% 41166
Granted stock options last year 20.4% 41158
Value of stock options, if hold options:
Mean dollar value of unvested options $112,882 8390
Mean dollar value of vested options $143,117 8497
Total dollar value:  Mean $249,901 8656
                           Median $75,000 8656
% of pay:             Mean 183.7% 8403
                           Median 100.0% 8403
% of wealth:         Mean 60.3% 8104
                           Median 28.6% 8104
Any of above programs 44.9% 85.7% 2430 41206  




Table B-1: Participation in Decisions by Type of Shared Capitalism Plan 
 
  Dep var.:  Involved in      Involved in      Involved in            Satisfied w/     
     job decs.      dept. goals      co. decs.      In EI team      participation     
     (1-4 scale)      (1-4 scale)      (1-4 scale)      (0-1 dummy)      (1-4 scale)     
      oprobit     oprobit     oprobit     OLS    oprobit     
      (1)        (2)       (3)       (4)     (5)      
B o n u s e s                          
  Profit sharing    0.016  (0.022)   -0.067 (0.021) ***  -0.101 (0.022) ***  0.046 (0.008) ***  -0.048 (0.021) ** 
 
Profit sharing bonus as % 
of base pay  0.269  (0.115) **  0.547 (0.098) ***  0.389 (0.097) ***  0.087 (0.039) **  0.321 (0.096) *** 
  Gainsharing    -0.052  (0.030) *  -0.071 (0.027) ***  -0.002 (0.028)   0.013 (0.011)   0.028 (0.026)  
 
Gainsharing bonus as % of 
base  pay  0.188  (0.133)  0.149 (0.111)  0.129 (0.107)  0.074 (0.043) *  0.040 (0.106)  
  Individual  bonus  0.096  (0.028) *** 0.123 (0.025) *** 0.093 (0.027) *** 0.005 (0.010)   0.040 (0.025)  
 
Indiv. bonus as % of base 
pay  0.280  (0.135) **  -0.044 (0.112)  -0.174 (0.111)  -0.036 (0.044)   0.207 (0.110) * 
S t o c k   o p t i o n s                             
  Stock  option  holding  -0.002  (0.045)  0.052 (0.039)  0.033 (0.038)   -0.052 (0.015) ***  -0.054 (0.037)  
 
Stock option value as % of 
base  pay  0.007  (0.007)   0.017 (0.006) *** 0.011 (0.005) **  0.008 (0.002) *** 0.015 (0.005) *** 
Employee  ownership                            
  Any  employee  ownership  0.043  (0.020) ** 0.039 (0.019) ** 0.043 (0.021) ** 0.032 (0.008) ***  -0.016 (0.019)  
 
Employee-owned stock 
as % of pay  0.018  (0.010) *  0.016 (0.009) *  0.007 (0.009)   0.002 (0.004)   0.026 (0.009) *** 
n      34439     34347    34309    34671    34337   
(pseudo)  R-sq.  0.125     0.117    0.086    0.123    0.074   
Cut point 1  0.149   (0.292)   1.958 (0.256)   2.617 (0.262)         0.132 (0.252)  
Cut  point  2  0.937  (0.292)  2.709 (0.256)  3.541 (0.262)        1.194 (0.252)  
Cut point 3  2.026  (0.292)    3.911 (0.256)    4.631  (0.263)             2.743 (0.252)   
Breakdowns by type of 
employee  ownership                         




  ESOP stock as % of pay  0.029  (0.022)   0.048 (0.021) **  0.029 (0.020)  0.002 (0.008)  0.052 (0.020) *** 
 ESPP  0.027  (0.044)   0.065 (0.039) *  0.038 (0.040)  -0.006 (0.016)   0.057 (0.038)  
  ESPP stock as % of pay  -0.031  (0.036)   -0.032 (0.031)  -0.003 (0.030)   0.003 (0.012)  -0.035 (0.030)  
  401(k)  stock  0.031  (0.018)  0.016 (0.018)  0.032 (0.019) * 0.042 (0.007) ***  0.021 (0.018)  
  401(k) stock as % of pay  0.046  (0.017) ***  0.030 (0.015) ** 0.011 (0.016)   -0.007 (0.006)   0.028 (0.015) * 
  Stock from options  -0.067  (0.043)   0.044 (0.038)   0.089 (0.037) **  0.039 (0.015) ***  -0.009 (0.037)  
 
Stock from options as % of 
pay  0.029  (0.025)  -0.012 (0.021)  -0.030 (0.020)  -0.009 (0.008)   0.025 (0.020)  
  Open  mkt.  stock  -0.046  (0.032)  0.014 (0.028)  0.027 (0.029)  0.002 (0.011)  0.069 (0.028) *** 
  
Open mkt. stock as % of 
pay  -0.072  (0.053)    -0.046 (0.045)    0.000 (0.044)    0.061 (0.018) ***  -0.044 (0.045)   
ESOP coefficients without 
f i x e d   e f f e c t s                          
  ESOP  0.126  (0.035) *** 0.227 (0.033) *** 0.252 (0.034) *** 0.014 (0.013)   -0.103 (0.032) *** 
   ESOP stock as % of pay  0.007  (0.021)    0.047 (0.019) ***  0.003 (0.018)    -0.001 (0.007)    0.015 (0.018)   
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 (s.e. in parentheses)                           





Table B-2: Company Treatment of Employees by Type of Shared Capitalism Plan 
 
                                               
  Dep var.:  Ees. share when     Co. fair      Co. grade:      Co. grade:      Co. grade:     
     co. does well      to ees.      sharing info     trustworthy     ee.  relations    
     (1-7 scale)      (1-7 scale)      (0-4 scale)      (0-4 scale)      (0-4 scale)     
      OLS     OLS     OLS     OLS     OLS    
      (1)        (2)       (3)       (4)     (5)      
Bonuses                           
  Profit sharing    0.481  (0.030) *** 0.126 (0.029) *** -0.003 (0.019)   -0.018 (0.019)   -0.031 (0.018)  * 
 
Profit sharing bonus as % of 
base pay  0.089 (0.136)   0.188 (0.131)   0.258 (0.087) *** 0.261 (0.089) *** 0.397 (0.083) *** 
  Gainsharing    0.106  (0.038) *** 0.136 (0.037) *** 0.021 (0.024)   0.037 (0.025)   0.021 (0.023)   
 
Gainsharing bonus as % of 
base  pay  -0.079 (0.151)   -0.167 (0.146)   0.074 (0.097)   0.005 (0.099)   0.107 (0.092)  
  Individual  bonus  0.047 (0.036)   0.023 (0.035)   0.074 (0.023) *** 0.105 (0.024) *** 0.082 (0.022) *** 
  Indiv. bonus as % of base pay  0.475  (0.156) *** 0.398 (0.151) *** 0.030 (0.100)  0.142 (0.102)   -0.022 (0.095)   
S t o c k   o p t i o n s                            
  Stock  option  holding  -0.078 (0.054)   -0.061 (0.052)   0.033 (0.034)   0.059 (0.035) *  0.035 (0.033)  
 
Stock option value as % of 
base pay  0.006 (0.008)   0.004 (0.007)   0.003 (0.005)   0.000 (0.005)   0.003 (0.005)  
Employee  ownership                           
  Any employee ownership  0.116  (0.028) *** 0.005 (0.027)   -0.016 (0.018)   -0.008 (0.018)   -0.013 (0.017)   
 
Employee-owned stock as % 
of  pay  0.041 (0.013) *** 0.027 (0.012) **  0.027 (0.008) *** 0.022 (0.008) *** 0.016 (0.008) ** 
n      34433     34395    34303   34242    34271   
(pseudo) R-sq.  0.196        0.203       0.164       0.205       0.179      
Breakdowns by type of employee 
ownership                           
  ESOP  -0.021 (0.077)   -0.207 (0.074) *** -0.242 (0.049) *** -0.158 (0.050) *** -0.197 (0.047) *** 
  ESOP stock as % of pay  0.027  (0.028)   0.026 (0.027)  0.035 (0.018) *  0.027 (0.018)   0.023 (0.017)   
  ESPP  0.120 (0.055) **  0.075 (0.053)   -0.009 (0.035)   0.028 (0.036)   0.006 (0.034)  




 401(k)  stock  0.161  (0.025) *** 0.037 (0.025)  0.019 (0.016)  0.024 (0.017)   0.020 (0.016)   
  401(k) stock as % of pay  0.065  (0.022) *** 0.066 (0.021) *** 0.067 (0.014) *** 0.048 (0.014) *** 0.042 (0.013) *** 
  Stock from options  0.042  (0.053)   0.001 (0.051)   -0.088 (0.034) *** -0.068 (0.034) **  -0.050 (0.032)   
 
Stock from options as % of 
pay  0.008 (0.028)   0.031 (0.027)   0.024 (0.018)   0.027 (0.019)   0.016 (0.017)  
  Open mkt. stock  0.010  (0.040)   0.055 (0.039)   0.056 (0.026) **  0.062 (0.026) **  0.030 (0.024)   
   Open mkt. stock as % of pay  0.013  (0.064)    -0.010 (0.062)    -0.029 (0.041)    -0.071 (0.041) *  -0.025 (0.039)    
ESOP coefficients without fixed 
effects                           
  ESOP  0.231 (0.047) *** -0.119 (0.045) *** -0.042 (0.030)   -0.103 (0.030) *** -0.047 (0.028) * 
   ESOP stock as % of pay  0.102  (0.026) *** 0.033 (0.025)    0.050 (0.017) *** 0.024 (0.017)    0.017 (0.016)    
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 (s.e. in parentheses)                           





Table B-3: Supervision and Training by Type of Shared Capitalism Plan 
 
                                      
  Dep var.: Free from      Formal      Training     Informal     
      supervision    training      hours     training    
     (0-10 scale)      (0-1 scale)            (1-4 scale)     
      OLS     OLS      Tobit     oprobit    
      (1)       (2)       (3)       (4)      
Bonuses                     
  Profit sharing    0.068 (0.044)   0.021 (0.009)  **  2.487 (1.192) **  -0.014 (0.021)  
 
Profit sharing bonus as % of base 
pay 0.175 (0.203)   0.067 (0.039)  *  6.948 (5.084)   0.190 (0.095) ** 
  Gainsharing    -0.106 (0.057) *  -0.010 (0.011)   -0.081 (1.470)   0.081 (0.026) ***
 
Gainsharing bonus as % of base 
pay 0.174 (0.225)   0.125 (0.044)  ***  24.545 (5.652) *** 0.036 (0.105)  
 Individual  bonus  0.029 (0.054)   0.050 (0.011)  ***  3.718 (1.403) *** 0.035 (0.025)  
  Indiv. bonus as % of base pay  0.344 (0.233)   -0.138 (0.045)  ***  -20.235 (5.823) *** -0.023 (0.109)  
Stock  options                     
 Stock  option  holding  -0.014 (0.080)   0.006 (0.016)   -1.398 (2.053)   0.096 (0.037) ***
 
Stock option value as % of base 
pay 0.017 (0.011)   -0.009 (0.002)  ***  -1.010 (0.280) *** 0.016 (0.005) ***
Employee  ownership                     
  Any employee ownership  0.034 (0.041)   0.045 (0.008)  ***  5.437 (1.133) *** -0.047 (0.019) ** 
  Employee-owned stock as % of pay 0.025 (0.019)   0.011 (0.004)  ***  1.041 (0.493) **  -0.005 (0.009)  
n      34671    34671    33834    34437   
(pseudo)  R-sq.  0.177    0.148    0.024    0.031   
Cut  point  1           -1.497 (0.252)  
Cut  point  2                 -0.598 (0.252)  
Cut  point  3                 0.786 (0.252)    
Breakdowns by type of employee 
ownership                     
 ESOP  0.402 (0.114) *** 0.054 (0.022)  **  7.987 (3.198) **  -0.099 (0.054) * 




 ESPP  0.051 (0.082)   0.011 (0.016)    2.352 (2.120)   0.024 (0.038)  
  ESPP stock as % of pay  -0.005 (0.063)   0.015 (0.012)   0.986 (1.595)   -0.012 (0.030)  
 401(k)  stock  0.057 (0.038)   0.050 (0.007)  ***  6.971 (1.056) *** -0.007 (0.018)  
  401(k) stock as % of pay  0.016 (0.032)   0.022 (0.006) ***  1.973 (0.835) **  0.012 (0.015)  
  Stock from options  -0.006 (0.078)   0.028 (0.015) *  1.093 (1.974)   -0.015 (0.037)  
  Stock from options as % of pay -0.018 (0.042)   -0.007 (0.008)    -0.086 (1.068)   -0.003 (0.020)  
  Open mkt. stock  -0.027 (0.060)   -0.004 (0.012)    0.584 (1.507)   -0.028 (0.028)  
   Open mkt. stock as % of pay  0.046 (0.095)    0.003 (0.018)     -0.268 (2.357)    -0.012 (0.044)   
ESOP coefficients without fixed effects                         
 ESOP  0.403 (0.067) *** 0.169 (0.014)  ***  15.145 (1.857) *** -0.087 (0.032) ***
   ESOP stock as % of pay  0.121 (0.040) *** 0.018 (0.008)  ***  2.043 (1.000) **  -0.012 (0.018)   
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 (s.e. in parentheses)                       





Table B-4: Pay and Benefits by Type of Shared Capitalism Plan 
 
                                      
  Dep var.:  Fixed pay      Fixed pay      Total comp.          Grade of co. on       
           (% diff.      (% diff.      Wages      Benefits     
     (natural log)      from mkt.)      from mkt.)      (0-4 scale)      (0-4 scale)     
      OLS     OLS     OLS     OLS     OLS     
      (1)        (2)       (3)       (4)     (5)      
Bonuses                        
  Profit sharing    0.015  (0.007) **  0.222 (0.340)   -0.051 (0.362)    0.069 (0.018) ***  0.068 (0.018) *** 
 
Profit sharing bonus 
as % of base pay  0.168  (0.032) ***  1.057 (1.490)   8.130 (1.587) ***  0.194 (0.085) **  0.329 (0.084) *** 
  Gainsharing    0.028  (0.009) ***  0.374 (0.439)   1.544 (0.456)  ***  0.033 (0.024)   0.026 (0.024)  
 
Gainsharing bonus 
as % of base pay  -0.079  (0.035) **  -0.664 (1.668)   -3.522 (1.765)  *  0.059 (0.095)   0.021 (0.094)  
 Individual  bonus  0.007  (0.008)   -0.725 (0.423) *  -0.607 (0.444)   0.023 (0.023)   0.089 (0.022) *** 
 
Indiv. bonus as % of 
base pay  0.039  (0.036)   4.148 (1.712) **  12.875 (1.832)  ***  0.193 (0.098) **  -0.119 (0.097)  
Stock  options                           
 Stock  option  holding  0.160  (0.013) ***  0.594 (0.629)   1.013 (0.666)   -0.002 (0.033)   0.024 (0.033)  
 
Stock option value 
as % of base pay  0.012  (0.002) ***  0.282 (0.081) *** 0.601 (0.088)  ***  0.007 (0.005)   0.002 (0.005)  
Employee  ownership                           
 
Any employee 
ownership  0.066 (0.007) ***  0.012 (0.308)   0.251 (0.331)    -0.008 (0.016)   0.040 (0.016) ** 
 
Employee-owned 
stock as % of pay  -0.009  (0.003) ***  -0.127 (0.158)   0.244 (0.158)    0.000 (0.008)   0.002 (0.008)  
n      27359     27320    26401    34408    34363   
(pseudo) R-sq.  0.765        0.063       0.137       0.108       0.164      




Breakdowns by type of 
employee ownership                        
 ESOP  0.144  (0.020) ***  -0.168 (1.020)   0.751 (1.331)   -0.051 (0.048)   0.031 (0.047)  
 
ESOP stock as % of 
pay -0.006  (0.007)   -0.414 (0.360)   0.949 (0.401)  **  -0.008 (0.018)   0.018 (0.017)  
 ESPP  0.051  (0.013) ***  0.943 (0.651)   1.629 (0.698) **  0.037 (0.034)   0.060 (0.034) * 
 
ESPP stock as % of 
pay  -0.086 (0.010) ***  0.079 (0.488)   -0.041 (0.532)    0.002 (0.027)   -0.008 (0.026)  
 401(k)  stock  0.042  (0.007) ***  -0.188 (0.307)   0.219 (0.323)   -0.004 (0.016)   0.029 (0.016) * 
 
401(k) stock as % of 
pay -0.006  (0.005)   -0.270 (0.309)   -0.079 (0.252)    0.011 (0.014)   -0.008 (0.013)  
  Stock from options  0.012  (0.012)   1.354 (0.580) **  1.503 (0.620)  **  -0.003 (0.033)   -0.035 (0.033)  
 
Stock from options 
as % of pay  0.005 (0.007)   -0.233 (0.306)   -0.126 (0.332)    0.007 (0.018)   0.017 (0.018)  
  Open mkt. stock  0.072  (0.010) ***  0.833 (0.434) *  0.956 (0.463)  **  0.003 (0.025)   0.011 (0.025)  
  
Open mkt. stock as % 
of pay  -0.018  (0.015)    -1.548 (0.684) **  -1.006 (0.743)     -0.058 (0.040)    -0.034 (0.039)   
ESOP coefficients 
without fixed effects                        
 ESOP  0.193  (0.017) ***  0.834 (0.555)   -0.674 (0.665)   0.006 (0.028)   0.299 (0.027) *** 
  
ESOP stock as % of 
pay 0.037  (0.010) ***  -0.766 (0.388) **  1.643 (0.379)  ***  -0.063 (0.017) ***  -0.010 (0.016)    
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 (s.e. in 
parentheses)                       





Table B-5: Job Security and Satisfaction by Type of Shared Capitalism Plan 
 
                    
  Dep var.: Not likely to      Job     
     lose job      satisfaction    
     (1-4 scale)      (1-7 scale)     
      oprobit     OLS    
      (1)       (2)      
Bonuses           
  Profit sharing    0.102 (0.021) *** -0.063 (0.023) ***
  Profit sharing bonus as % of base pay 0.486 (0.098) *** 0.255 (0.105) ** 
  Gainsharing    0.068 (0.027) *** 0.025 (0.029)  
  Gainsharing bonus as % of base pay  -0.021 (0.109)   0.270 (0.117) ** 
 Individual  bonus  0.057 (0.026) **  0.023 (0.028)  
  Indiv. bonus as % of base pay  -0.046 (0.112)   0.168 (0.121)  
Stock options              
 Stock  option  holding  0.040 (0.039)   -0.008 (0.041)  
  Stock option value as % of base pay  0.011 (0.005) **  0.007 (0.006)  
Employee ownership              
  Any employee ownership  0.082 (0.020) *** -0.006 (0.021)  
  Employee-owned stock as % of pay 0.018 (0.009) **  0.001 (0.010)  
n      34671    34525   
(pseudo)  R-sq.  0.042    0.107   
Cut point 1  -1.917 (0.259)        
Cut point 2  -1.175 (0.259)        
Cut point 3  0.476 (0.259)            
Breakdowns by type of employee ownership            
 ESOP  -0.001 (0.056)   -0.038 (0.059)  
  ESOP stock as % of pay  0.042 (0.021) **  -0.002 (0.022)  
 ESPP  -0.058 (0.040)   -0.027 (0.042)  




 401(k)  stock  0.096 (0.018) *** -0.001 (0.020)  
  401(k) stock as % of pay  0.054 (0.015) *** 0.018 (0.017)  
  Stock from options  -0.089 (0.038) ** -0.006 (0.041)  
  Stock from options as % of pay 0.013 (0.020)   -0.003 (0.022)  
  Open mkt. stock as % of pay  0.038 (0.046)   -0.033 (0.049)  
   Open mkt. stock  0.008 (0.029)    0.005 (0.031)   
ESOP coefficients without fixed effects             
 ESOP  0.299 (0.034) *** 0.090 (0.036) ***
   ESOP stock as % of pay  0.043 (0.020) **  -0.029 (0.020)   
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 (s.e. in parentheses)           
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